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ADMISSIBILITY OF AN AGENT'S DECLARATIONS
AGAINST HIS EMPLOYER UNDER
EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1224*
Section 1224 of the California Evidence Code provides:
When the liability, obligation, or duty of a party to a civil action is
based in whole or in part upon the liability, obligation, or duty of the
declarant, or when the claim or right asserted by a party to a civil
action is barred or diminished by a breach of duty by the declarant,
evidence of a statement made by the declarant is as admissible against
the party as it would be if offered against the declarant in an action
involving that liability, obligation, duty, or breach of duty.
The first suggestion that Evidence Code section 1224 might con-
stitute a basis for admitting the unauthorized declarations of an
agent in a respondeat superior action against his employer came in
Markley v. Beagle.' Markley, a refrigeration serviceman, was in-
jured in a fall from a balcony due to a defective railing. Having the
status of a business invitee, the serviceman sued the owner of the
building for negligence. Markley also sued a contractor whose
workmen had dismantled the railing in order to remove some equip-
ment. The trial court admitted a hearsay declaration of Hood, one
of the contractor's employees who worked on the removal of the
railing, to the effect that the contractor's workmen had taken down
the railing to remove the equipment and had replaced it in what
Hood thought was its former condition. The jury returned a verdict
for Markley against both the owner and the contractor.
The district court of appeal confirmed the propriety of admitting
Hood's hearsay declarations.2 Admissibility was justified under for-
mer Code of Civil Procedure section 18513 (recodified in Evidence
Code sections 1224 and 1302) which provided that when the obliga-
tion or duty of a party is based upon the obligation or duty of a third
person, evidence of a statement made by that person is admissible
against the party if it would be admissible against the declarant in an
action involving that obligation or duty. Hood's statements were
admissible, because the contractor's obligation depended in part upon
the obligation of Hood.
The California Supreme Court reversed Markley's judgment
against the contractor on the basis that former Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 18514 did not apply to the respondeat superior situa-
tion:
* The writer is indebted to Professor Judson Falknor, Hastings College
of the Law, who generously gave his time, criticism and encouragement.
Nevertheless, the conclusions reached below are those of the writer and do
not reflect the views of Professor Falknor.
1 66 A.C. 1003, 429 P.2d 129, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1967).
2 54 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1966), vacated, 66 A.C. 1003, 429 P.2d 129, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 809 (1967).
3 Cal. Stats. 1873-1874 (Code Amendments), ch. 383, § 216, at 380.
4 And EVIDENCE CODE § 1224 by way of dicta.
[1395)
We conclude that the terms "obligation or duty" in former sec-
tion 1851 and "liability, obligation, or duty" in Evidence Code sections
1224 and 1302 do not include tort liabilities of employees that are
imputed to their employers under the doctrine of respondeat superior.5
Markley was decided under former section 1851 and the court's
statements are only dicta as to section 1224. However, since section
1224 has now replaced section 1851, this note will be addressed to
section 1224.
The following discussion is designed to demonstrate that section
1224 should be applied to the respondeat superior situation. Not
only is such a construction logically supportable, but it would also
establish criteria for the admissibility of agents' hearsay declarations
which would implement the purpose of the hearsay rule by making
admissibility turn on trustworthiness. The benefits to be derived
from applying section 1224 to respondeat superior cases are best
appreciated when contrasted with the present California law and the
problems generated by having admissibility turn solely upon the
agency concept of authority.
The Present Law
Evidence Code section 12226 regulates the admissibility of an
agent's declaration in a suit against his employer according to the
substantive law of agency. Admissibility turns upon the presence of
"speaking authority," that is, whether the agent was expressly or
impliedly authorized to speak for his employer. Under section 1222
the fact that an agent was authorized to act for an employer does not
authorize that agent to make statements for the employer concern-
ing his acts.7
Contrasted with the requirement of speaking authority in sec-
tion 1222 is the more permissive rule promulgated by the Model Code
of Evidence8 and the Uniform Rules of EvidenceY Under this rule,
even though the declarant lacked speaking authority, his declaration
is admissible if it "concerned a matter within the scope of an agency
or employment of the declarant . . . and was made before the ter-
mination" of the agency. 10 While Evidence Code section 1222 re-
quires a showing of speaking authority, it must be remembered that
it is within the court's power to create new exceptions to the hearsay
5 Markley v. Beagle, 66 A.C. 1003, 1012, 429 P.2d 129, 135, 59 Cal. Rptr.
809, 815 (1967).
6 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1222 provides: "Evidence of a statement offered
against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if:
"(a) The statement was made by a person authorized by the party to
make a statement or statements for him concerning the subject matter of the
statement; and
"(b) The evidence is offered either after admission of evidence suffi-
cient to sustain a finding of such authority or, in the court's discretion as to
the order of proof, subject to the admission of such evidence."
7 See CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1222, comment; cf. McComvRncK, EViDENCE
§ 244 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoamvcK].
8 MODEL CODE Or EVIDENCE rule 508(a) (1942).
9 UNiFo~mI RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(9) (a).
10 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508 (a) (1942); UNIFoRm RULE or EVI-
DENCE 63 (9) (a).
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rule."i Thus, despite the existence of section 1222, the court could
adopt the Uniform Rules' position eliminating the requirement of
speaking authority. This is due to the wording of Evidence Code
section 1200: "Except as provided by law, hearsay evidence is inad-
missible." But "law" includes decisional law in addition to statutory
and constitutional law.12 Two cases prior to the adoption of the
Evidence Code apparently did adopt the Model Code-Uniform Rules'
position. 3
Whether the courts retain the requirement of speaking authority
or not, there are problems with either alternative. The orthodox rule
requiring speaking authority overlooks the possibility that some un-
authorized statement may warrant an assumption of reliability:
To the extent that need and probable reliability are acceptable criteria
in fashioning exceptions to the hearsay rule, it seems that the prin-
ciple of authorized admissions [i.e. the requirement of speaking au-
thority] is not an adequate formula for the entire area of agents'
statements. This formula is so narrow that it fails to furnish the
basis for receipt into evidence of many trustworthy and needed state-
ments made by agents.' 4
The alternative position advocated by the Model Code' 5 and
Uniform Rules, 16 eliminating the speaking authority requirement,
runs the risk of admitting unreliable declarations. Any agent's state-
ment about a matter within the scope of the agency would be ad-
missible against the employer. But what guarantees the trustworthi-
ness of such a statement? The Model Code of Evidence defends its
position in the comment to rule 508:
[T]he agent ... in speaking about the transaction which it was
within his authority to perform is likely to be telling the truth in
most instances-much more likely than when later summoned to
give testimony against his principal....
However, one authority questions whether trustworthiness can
be assumed from the mere circumstance that the declarant was speak-
ing of authorized conduct:
If an agent "is likely to be telling the truth" about a past authorized
act, cannot it be said with equal correctness that any declarant . . .
is 'likely to be telling the truth" about his past act, if it was an act
he had a right to perform ... ?17
Both of the above tests of admissibility employ the agency con-
cept of authority. One requires speaking authority, the other re-
11 McDonough, The California Evidence Code: A Pricis, 18 HASTINGS
L.J. 89, 92 (1966).
12 CAL. EVIDENcE CODE § 160.
'3 Shields v. Oxnard Harbor Dist., 46 Cal. App. 2d 477, 116 P.2d 121
(1941) (agent's admission of fault in causing collision admitted against his
employer); Johnson v. Bimini Hot Springs, 56 Cal. App. 2d 892, 133 P.2d 650
(1943) (declarations of defendant's assistant manager as to the slippery con-
dition of the floor admitted against defendant owner upon proof of agency,
citing Shields v. Oxnard Harbor Dist., supra). But see 4 CAL. LAW RnrisioN
COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOmmENDATIONS & STUDIEs 488 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as CAL. L. REVISION COmm'N] (suggesting possible basis for distinguishment).
'4 4 CAL. L. REVsiON Comm'N 488 (1963).
15 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 508 (a) (1942).
16 UNIFoIRm RULE OF EVIDENCE 63 (9) (a).
'7 Falknor, Vicarious Admissions and the Uniform Rules, 14 VANi. L.
REV. 855, 857 (1961).
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quires only authority to do the act spoken about. Both tests fail as
instruments for determining trustworthiness: the speaking author-
ity test because it excludes all unauthorized statements regardless
of their reliability; the Uniform Rules' test because it would let in too
many unreliable statements. What is needed is the coupling of the
speaking authority test (section 1222) with another independent basis
of admissibility enabling the introduction of those declarations which
-although lacking authority-justify an assumption of trustworthi-
ness. Evidence Code section 1224, if applied to respondeat superior
cases, would fill this need.
With this background, the following discussion will illustrate:
(1) the propriety of bringing respondeat superior cases within the
compass of section 1224; and (2) the salutary effect such a construction
would produce by establishing reliability-instead of authority-as
the basis for admissibility of agents' hearsay declarations.
Section 1224 and Respondeat Superior
Markley v. Beagle's held that former Code of Civil Procedure
section 1851, the precursor of Evidence Code section 1224, did not
embrace the respondeat superior situation; however, the court ad-
mitted that the language of section 1851 was "susceptible of [such] an
interpretation. . . -19 The issue was one of first impression in that
no court had ever applied or even discussed section 1851's application
in a respondeat superior context.20 Nevertheless, the court inter-
preted the dearth of authority as indicating that section 1851 did not
apply to respondeat superior situations:
We are convinced, however, that the failure of any case to consider
that possibility was not the result of oversight, but reflected a tacit
understanding that section 1851 did not change the settled and ap-
parently universally followed rule that hearsay statements of an agent
or employee not otherwise admissible against the principal or em-
ployer are not made admissible merely because they may tend to prove
negligence of the agent or employee that may be imputed to the
principal or employer under the doctrine of Tespondeat superior.21
Such negative authority is, at best, weak. The validity of a legal
argument should not be foreclosed by the fortuitous circumstance
that it has never been raised previously. At any rate, a "tacit
understanding" among the bar is less than an imposing legal prece-
dent.
While no court has applied section 1224 (or former section 1851)
in a respondeat superior case, various authorities have indicated the
propriety of such an application. In its discussion of Uniform Rule
63(9) (c)-which is substantially the same as section 1224-the Cal-
ifornia Law Revision Commission states: "If the case is a respondeat
superior case and if the statement inculpates the agent and was
made during the agency, it is admissible under both Rule 63 (9) (a) and
Rule 63 (9) (c)."22 The Commission also states:
Although it is difficult to discover a distinguishing principle, for some
18 66 A.C. 1003, 429 P.2d 129, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1967).
19 Id. at 1011, 429 P.2d at 134, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
20 Id. at 1010, 429 P.2d at 134, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
21 Id. at 1011, 429 P.2d at 134, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
22 4 CAL. L. REVIsION Comm'x 490 (1963).
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reason Section 1851 has never been cited nor discussed in any of the
cases dealing with the liability of an employer under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. It would appear that a respondeat superior
case would fall within . . . the language of Section 1851 .... 23
Professor John McDonough, chairman of the California Law
Revision Commission when the Evidence Code was prepared, states
unequivocally that section 1224 is applicable in respondeat superior
situations:
[Sjection 1851 . . .has not, for some inexplicable reason, been ap-
plied in actions against employers for torts committed by their em-
ployees. Section 1224 makes it quite clear 24 that the admission of
the employee is admissible against the employer when the latter's
liability is based on respondeat superior.25
Rule 508(c) of the Model Code of Evidence was modeled after
section 1851.26 In the Model Code's example of the operation of
508(c), the authors presented a respondeat superior case. While
seeing no reason for not applying 508(c) to respondeat superior
cases, the reporter conceded that such an application would "make
material changes in existing law."27 However, it must be remembered
that the ensuing "changes in the law" would not be the overruling of
prior cases, but merely extending the application of the section to
include a situation, i.e. the respondeat superior case, not previously
covered.
Since the respondeat superior case falls within the wording
of section 1224, the only basis for denying application of the section
is the existence of a meaningful distinction between the situation to
which section 1224 is currently applied and the respondeat superior
situation. For the most part, section 1224's predecessor, section 1851,
had been restricted to cases where the relationship between the de-
clarant and the party against whom his statement was sought to be
introduced had been one of principal and surety.28 Some of these
cases involved suretyship contracts imposing direct and unconditional
liability upon the surety.2 9 In such cases, the creditor-surety rela-
tionship is quite similar to the relationship between the plaintiff
and the employer under respondeat superior. The creditor or plain-
tiff can proceed directly against the surety or employer without first
attempting to recover from the person who is primarily liable.30 The
23 Id. at 494-95.
24 Perhaps Professor McDonough is referring to the insertion of the word
"liability" in section 1224 where the predecessor section 1851 only referred to
"obligation or duty."
25 McDonough, supra note 11, at 114.
26 McCoamacx § 244.
27 MODEL CODE OF EVIzDNCE rule 508(c), Comment (1942).
28 4 CAL. L. REvmsiON Coavnv'N 494 (1963); see, e.g., Butte County v.
Morgan, 76 Cal. 1, 18 P. 115 (1888). The term "surety" is used in the broad
sense and embraces the situation where the surety's obligation is conditioned
upon the inability of the creditor to collect from the principal. See CAL. Civ.
CODE § 2787; RESTATEMTENT OF SECURITY § 82; G. OSBORNE, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 10 (1967).
29 See, e.g., Butte County v. Morgan, 76 Cal. 1, 18 P. 115 (1888); Nye &
Nissen, Inc. v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 71 Cal. App. 2d 570, 163 P.2d 100
(1945).
30 See Wills v. J.J. Newberry Co., 43 Cal. App. 2d 595, 602, 111 P.2d 346,
349 (1941).
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main difference between the liability of a surety and an employer
is the source of their obligation: the surety's obligation is contrac-
tual3' while the employer's is relational and nonconsensual in na-
ture.32  This is a difference to be sure, but it is not relevant to
the issue at hand-the admissibility of evidence under section 1224.
Rather, the one common denominator of both the surety and the re-
spondeat superior cases-the fact that the liability of the surety or
employer depends directly upon the liability of the principal or
agent3 -is the reason why section 1224 should apply equally to both
situations. For in both cases "the liability, obligation, or duty of a
party [whether surety or employer] . .. is based . . .upon the lia-
bility, obligation, or duty of the declarant [whether principal or em-
ployee] . . ."34 This is all that section 1224 requires.
In addition to the surety cases, where the obligation is contrac-
tual, the California courts have twice35 applied former section 1851 to
situations where the liability of the party against whom the declara-
tion was sought to be introduced was noncontractual in origin. In
Ingram v. Bob Jaffe Co.,36 the statement of a person permitted to
operate a vehicle was admitted against the owner of the vehicle in
an action against that owner under the derivative liability estab-
lished in Vehicle Code section 17150Y.3 This situation, where the
owner of a vehicle is made liable for damage caused by any person
he permits to drive the vehicle, is very similar to the respondeat
superior situation. In the language of the California Law Revision
Commission: "It would appear that a respondeat superior case
would fall within . . . the principle upheld in ... Ingram ... 2'38
The point sought to be made is that, as far as admissibility of evidence
under section 1224 is concerned, respondeat superior is not signifi-
cantly different from Ingram and the surety cases.
Consistency With Inferable Legislative Intent
In Markley v. Beagle39 counsel for contractor Beagle argued that
the admissibility of agents' unauthorized declarations via section 1224
would contravene legislative intent, because such an interpretation
31 G. OSBORNE, supra note 28, at 10.
32 Fernilius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. 2d 226, 233, 138 P.2d 12, 17 (1943); see CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2338 (codifying the common law doctrine of respondeat superior).
33 In a suit against the employer under respondeat superior, the liability
of the employer is only partly dependent upon the liability of the employee.
The plaintiff must also prove that the employee was in the scope of his
employment. 1 B. WITHI, SUmMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Agency and
Employment § 72 (7th ed. 1960). CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1224 carefully pro-
vides: 'When the liability . . . of a party . . . is based in whole or in part
upon the liability ... " (emphasis added).
34 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1224.
35 Ellsworth v. Bradford, 186 Cal. 316, 199 P. 335 (1921); Ingram v. Bob
Jaffe Co., 139 Cal. App. 2d 193, 293 P.2d 132 (1956).
36 139 Cal. App. 2d 193, 293 P.2d 132 (1956).
37 Formerly Cal. Vehicle Code § 402(a), Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 27, § 402(a),
at 153.
38 4 CAL. L. REVISIoN Comm'N 495 (1963).
39 66 A.C. 1003, 429 P.2d 129, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1967).
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would nullify section 1222's requirement of speaking authority.40
This argument fails to take account of: (1) the statement of the
California Law Revision Commission; (2) the wording of section 1222
itself; and (3) the interrelationship of sections 1222 and 1224. As
mentioned above, the Law Revision Commission clearly envisioned
the possibility of applying section 1224 to respondeat superior
cases. 41 Secondly, the language of section 1222 is inclusionary:
"Evidence of a statement.., is not made inadmissible by the hear-
say rule if .... ." This section does not say that no unauthorized
statement of an agent shall be admitted but merely that such state-
ments are not admissible under section 1222. The result is that evi-
dence of an unauthorized statement, while not admissible under sec-
tion 1222, may still be admissible if it can qualify under another hear-
say exception. Certainly, an unauthorized declaration of an agent
will be admissible if it satisfies the requirements for a declaration
against interest 42 or a spontaneous utterance.43 Thus, the fact that
an agent's declaration does not satisfy the "speaking authority" re-
quirement for authorized admissions should not preclude its ad-
mission under another exception to the hearsay rule which will
equally guarantee its trustworthiness.
The application of section 1224 to respondeat superior cases will
not eliminate the speaking authority requirement of Evidence Code
section 1222. It is true, however, that certain unauthorized declara-
tions of agents will become admissible which would not be admissible
under section 1222. But such a construction would not operate to
confer "speaking authority" upon all agents. For example, suppose X
corporation employs two truck drivers to make cross-country deliver-
ies. The drivers alternate sleeping and driving to enable them to be
on the road 24 hours a day. Driver 1 is involved in an accident.
After the excitement of the accident is over, Dl and D2 both make
statements to the effect that D1 was speeding. Neither of these
statements could come in under section 1222 because of the lack of
speaking authority. However, lack of speaking authority does not
prevent admissibility under some other exception to the hearsay rule.
The statement of Dl should come in under section 1224, because, in a
respondeat superior suit against X corporation, X's liability turns in
part upon that of D1. However, D2's statement would not be ad-
missible under section 1224, because his liability is not in issue. .Thus,
application of section 1224 to respondeat superior actions would not
eliminate the effect of section 1222's requirement of speaking author-
ity, but it would provide an independent basis of admissibility on
nonagency grounds.
Finally, even assuming without conceding that the argued-for
application of section 1224 would be inconsistent with section 1222, it
has been pointed out above that the Evidence Code empowers the
courts to create new exceptions to the hearsay rule.44 The foregoing
arguments advocating the application of section 1224 to respondeat
40 Brief for appellant at 8, Markley v. Beagle, 66 A.C. 1003, 429 P.2d 129,
59 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1967).
41 See notes 22, 23 & 25 supra.
42 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1230.
43 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1240.
44 See note 11 supra; CAL. EVIDENCE CODE §§ 160, 1200.
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superior situations have necessarily assumed the validity of that sec-
tion as an exception to the hearsay rule. While proof of such validity
is beyond the scope of this note, the following discussion suggests
that agents' declarations admitted under section 1224 would justify
an assumption of trustworthiness.
Policy
In the words of the reporter of the Model Code of Evidence:
[I] f a law suit includes a rational investigation of a dispute as to facts,
it seems entirely reasonable to use the same evidence to establish the
liability of X in an action between P and D as would be used to
establish the same liability in an action between P and X.45
The law of evidence should admit all relevant evidence provided that
it is trustworthy.46 The hearsay rule and its exceptions are the
tests of trustworthiness. 47 In a suit against an agent for his negli-
gence, any relevant statements of that agent are admissible, because
they are party admissions.48 Thus, the agent's admissions would be
reliable evidence (by virtue of satisfying the requirements for a
hearsay exception) for proving his negligence in a suit against him.
If such admissions are reliable evidence in a suit against the agent
on the issue of his negligence, then the same declarations ought to
be equally reliable in a suit against the agent's employer on the same
issue. If the issue, i.e. the agent's negligence, remains the same, the
reliability of the declaration is not diminished merely because the
defendant is the employer instead of the agent.
As a practical matter, the trustworthiness of the agent's declara-
tions is further assured by the fact that a statement which would be
relevant in proving his liability would necessarily be against his
interest.49 This is not to say that the declaration would qualify for
admission under Evidence Code section 1230 (declarations against
interest). The agent's declaration would not be "against interest"
under section 1230 unless the agent was unavailable as a witness, but
this qualification has nothing to do with the trustworthiness of the
statement.50 Also, admissibility under section 1230 might be pre-
cluded by: (1) that section's requirement that the declaration be
against interest when made; (2) the possibility that the declaration
might not be against interest to the degree required by section
1230.51
45 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508 (c), Comment (1942).
46 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 351 provides: "Except as otherwise provided by
statute, all relevant evidence is admissible." One statutory exception is the
trial judge's limited discretion. See CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 352.
47 See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420, 1422 (3d ed. 1940); B. JONES, Evi-
DENCE § 269 (5th ed. S. Gard. rev. 1958).
48 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1220.
49 See 4 CAL. L. REVIsIoN CoIm'N 489 (1963); cf. McCoimwcK § 244.
50 "If she [declarant] was available, however, the credibility of her ex-
trajudicial statements would not be lessened by that fact." People v. Spriggs,
60 Cal. 2d 868, 875, 389 P.2d 377, 381, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 845. The requirement
of unavailability contained in Evidence Code section 1230 is largely illusory.
If the declarant testifies inconsistently in court, the proponent can introduce
the declarant's prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence of the
facts stated. CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1235.
51 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1230 requires that the statement be: "so far con-
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Consider the situation where the injured plaintiff sues both the
agent and his employer. The plaintiff seeks to introduce the agent's
statement concerning the accident. 52 Unless section 1224 is applied,
the court will admit the statement only against the agent, and the
jury will be asked to perform the psychologically impossible task of
considering the statement as evidence against the agent but not em-
ploying it in determining the liability of the employer.53 Fortunately,
the court has recognized that the liability of the employer follows
automatically upon proof of the liability of the employee.54 Thus, the
plaintiff can recover a judgment against the employer on the basis
of the employee's hearsay declaration (introduced against the em-
ployee) even though the declaration is not admissible against the
employer.55 But what if the plaintiff sues the employer without
joining the employee? Unless section 1224 is applied, the employee's
hearsay declaration will not be admissible. It seems rather un-
realistic to deny admission when the suit is only against the employer
but to permit the plaintiff to take advantage of the declaration by
merely joining the employee as codefendant. Surely admissibility
should turn on something more than joinder.
Scope of Admitted Declarations
If an agent's declarations are admitted under section 1224, care
must be taken to limit the declarations admitted to those permitted
by the statute. Section 1224 states that a declaration is only "as ad-
missible against the party [e.g., the employer] as it would be if offered
against the declarant [e.g., the agent]." In other words the test of
admissibility under section 1224 in a respondeat superior suit against
an employer is whether the declaration would likewise be admissible
against the agent on the same issue. For example, in a respondeat
superior suit against an employer, the declarations of an agent tending
to prove his negligence should be admitted under section 1224, be-
cause they would be admitted in a suit against the agent.56 How-
trary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far [subject]
him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far [tend] to render invalid
a claim by him against another, or [create] such a risk of making him an
object of hatred, or ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he
believed it to be true."
Chief Justice Traynor said in Markley that Hood's statement was not suf-
ficiently against interest to meet the standard of section 1230. 66 A.C. at
1009 n.1, 429 P.2d at 133 n.1, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 813 n.l.
52 Assume that his statements are not otherwise admissible under the
hearsay exceptions for excited utterances or declarations against interest.
53 Shaver v. United Parcel Serv., 90 Cal. App. 764, 266 P. 608 (1928)
(Agent's declaration, "I could have stopped, but I thought the trailer was
going to stop," was admitted against the agent but not against his employer).
54 Gorzeman v. Artz, 13 Cal. App. 2d 660, 57 P.2d 550 (1936) (upheld
judgment against employer despite fact that only evidence of employee's
negligence was declarations of the employee which were admitted only as to
the employee). Of course, the employee's negligent act must have been done
within the scope of his employment. 1 B. Wrnmw, supra note 33.
55 Id.
56 CAL. EVINcE CODE § 1220.
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ever, declarations of the agent tending to show that he was in
the scope of his employment at the time of the negligent act would
not be admitted under section 1224. This follows because, if the suit
were against the agent, it would not be necessary to prove that the
agent was acting in the scope of his employment and, therefore, evi-
dence to that effect would be irrelevant and inadmissible.
Conclusion
Section 1222 with its requirement of speaking authority is a valid
test for the trustworthiness of agents' hearsay statements. But it
should not be the only basis of admissibility. To make admissibility
turn solely upon authorization results in the exclusion of some state-
ments which justify an assumption of reliability. The construction
of section 1224 to embrace respondeat superior cases would insure the
admissibility of statements whose reliability stems not from author-
ity, but from the fact that the declarant was speaking to his own
liability as well as to that of his employer. "Indeed, it is the failure
of the courts to adjust the rules of admissibility more flexibly and
realistically to these variations in the reliability of hearsay that...
constitutes one of the pressing needs for liberalization of evidence
law."57
William T. Weaver*
57 McCoRMIcK § 224, at 459.
* Member, Third Year Class.
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